Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
防策略性社会选择对应与单峰偏好
Strategy-Proof social choice correspondences and single-peaked preferences
摘要
We consider strategy-proof social choice correspondences (SCCs) –mappings from preference profiles to sets of alternatives– when individuals are endowed with single-peaked preferences over alternatives. We interpret the selected sets of alternatives as the basis for lotteries that determine the final social choice, and consider that agents’ preferences over sets are consistent with Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating from an initial probability assessment over the full set of alternatives. We exploit the relation between SCCs and probabilistic decision schemes –mappings from preference profiles to lotteries over alternatives–, to characterize the family of SCCs that satisfy strategy-proofness and unanimity for arbitrary initial probability assessments. We extend the analysis to multi-dimensional convex spaces of alternatives under the uniform initial probability assessment.
中文摘要
本文考虑策略性防策略的社会选择对应（SCCs）——即从偏好分布到备选方案集合的映射——当个体对备选方案具有单峰偏好时。我们将所选的备选方案集合视为决定最终社会选择的抽签基础，并假设个体对集合的偏好与期望效用理论一致，且基于对全部备选方案的初始概率评估进行贝叶斯更新。通过利用SCCs与概率决策方案（即从偏好分布到备选方案抽签的映射）之间的关系，我们刻画了在任意初始概率评估下满足策略防策略性和一致性的SCCs族。在均匀初始概率评估假设下，我们将分析扩展至多维凸空间中的备选方案。