Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
子博弈序保持与TU博弈的值
Sub-game order preservation and values for TU-games
摘要
In cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), a player’s contribution may vary depending on the coalition they join, reflecting different levels of synergy with other members. In this paper, we introduce a family of axioms referred to as sub-game order preservation axioms , which formalize the intuition that a player’s payoff should increase with the degree of synergy they exhibit within a coalition. We propose four distinct axioms, each of which captures a different interpretation of what constitutes synergy in the context of TU-games. We demonstrate that one of these variants is incompatible with the classical Efficiency axiom, thereby giving rise to an impossibility result. The remaining three axioms, when combined with Efficiency, lead to unique characterizations of three well-known solution concepts: the Shapley value, the Center of the imputation set (CIS), and the Equal allocation of non-separable contributions (ENSC) value, respectively.
中文摘要
在具有可转移效用的合作博弈（TU博弈）中，参与者的贡献可能因其加入的联盟不同而有所变化，这反映了与其他成员之间不同程度的协同效应。本文引入了一组公理，称为子博弈序保持公理，这些公理形式化了参与者的收益应随其在联盟中展现的协同程度增加而提高的直觉。我们提出了四个不同的公理，每个公理都捕捉了TU博弈背景下协同概念的不同解释。我们证明，其中一个变体与经典的效率公理不相容，从而产生了一个不可能性结果。其余三个公理在与效率公理结合时，分别导致了对三个著名解概念的独特刻画：沙普利值、分配集中心（CIS）以及不可分离贡献的均等分配（ENSC）值。