Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
政府采购招标中的目标投标人
Targeted bidders in government tenders
摘要
A set-aside promotes a more equitable procurement process by restricting participation in government tenders to small or disadvantaged businesses. Yet its micro-effects on tender outcomes (competition and contract efficiency) and targeted firm performance entail trade-offs, which we evaluate empirically using a decade of US federal procurement data. At the tender level, we employ a two-stage approach. First, we use random forest techniques to compute the propensity score for a tender being set aside based on rules implementation. Second, we employ the scores in an inverse probability weighting framework. We find that set-asides prompt more competition — implying that the rise in participation of targeted firms more than offsets the exclusion of untargeted ones — and contract inefficiency, measured by cost overruns and delays. We argue that adverse selection and moral hazard are mechanisms behind contract inefficiency. We then study the targeted firm behavior to uncover whether long-run benefits mitigate short-run drawbacks. We compare businesses differentially exposed to a set-aside spending shock through an event study framework. We find mixed evidence on firm growth.
中文摘要
预留政策通过将政府招标的参与资格限制在小型或弱势企业，促进了更公平的采购流程。然而，该政策对招标结果（竞争与合同效率）的微观效应以及对目标企业绩效的影响涉及权衡取舍，我们利用美国联邦采购十年数据对此进行实证评估。在招标层面，我们采用两阶段方法。首先，我们使用随机森林技术，基于规则实施情况计算某招标被预留的倾向得分。其次，我们将这些得分应用于逆概率加权框架。我们发现，预留政策促进了更多竞争——这意味着目标企业参与度的上升超过了非目标企业被排除的影响——同时也带来了合同低效，以成本超支和延误衡量。我们认为，逆向选择与道德风险是合同低效背后的机制。随后，我们研究目标企业行为，以揭示长期收益是否能够缓解短期弊端。我们通过事件研究框架，比较了受预留支出冲击程度不同的企业。我们发现关于企业成长的证据好坏参半。