Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
针对性说服
Targeted Persuasion
摘要
A sender wishes to persuade a group of receivers but can only communicate with one target receiver. The target’s actions, in turn, may influence others. Who should she target? How should she customize her communication? The sender optimally customizes communication to the target as if other receivers did not exist and trades off popularity against influence: she may optimally target less popular receivers. We characterize a measure of a target’s market influence that the sender maximizes and show that, in large markets, she strictly prefers less customizable communication if the market is more polarized or if high-popularity influencers are rare.
中文摘要
一位发送者希望说服一群接收者，但只能与其中一位目标接收者沟通。目标接收者的行为反过来可能影响其他人。她应当以谁为目标？又应如何定制其沟通？发送者会最优地将沟通定制给目标接收者，就好像其他接收者并不存在一样，并在受欢迎程度与影响力之间进行权衡：她可能最优地选择不那么受欢迎的接收者作为目标。我们刻画了一种发送者所最大化的目标市场影响力度量，并表明，在大规模市场中，如果市场更加极化，或者高受欢迎程度的影响者较为稀少，她会严格偏好可定制性较低的沟通。