Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
无贴现退出博弈的APS方法
The APS approach for undiscounted quitting games
摘要
Abstract Characterizing and explicitly computing equilibria of undiscounted dynamic games have been a challenge for many years. In this paper, we study quitting games , which are stopping games where the terminal payoff does not depend on the stage of termination. We adapt the recursive approach of Abreu et al. (Econometrica 58(5):1041–1063, 1990) to characterize a certain subset of the set of subgame-perfect $$\varepsilon $$ -equilibrium payoffs. Our approach is based on the novel representation of strategy profiles through absorption paths , which was developed in Ashkenazi-Golan et al. (Math Program 203(1–2):735–762, 2024), and our characterization focuses on absorption paths in which exactly one player randomizes between quitting and continuing at any point in time. Since quitting games form a special case of both stopping games and stochastic games, our approach may be useful in studying more general classes of these games.
中文摘要
摘要 多年来，对未折现动态博弈的均衡进行刻画并显式计算一直是一个挑战。本文研究退出博弈，即终止支付不依赖于终止阶段的停止博弈。我们借鉴Abreu等人（《计量经济学》58(5):1041–1063, 1990）的递归方法，刻画了子博弈完美ε-均衡支付集合中的某一特定子集。我们的方法基于通过吸收路径对策略组合的新颖表示，该表示由Ashkenazi-Golan等人（《数学规划》203(1–2):735–762, 2024）提出，并且我们的刻画聚焦于在任意时间点恰好有一名玩家在退出与继续之间随机化的吸收路径。由于退出博弈既是停止博弈又是随机博弈的特例，我们的方法可能有助于研究这些博弈的更一般类别。