Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
中央银行作为避风港：西班牙第二共和国的避险、民主化与信贷紧缩
The central bank as safe haven: Flight-to-safety, democratization, and credit contraction in the Spanish Second Republic
摘要
In the past, central banks were also retail institutions, directly accepting deposits from the public. This article studies a historical episode of flight-to-safety during a banking crisis in which large depositors withdrew their deposits from banks, moving them not only abroad or into cash, but also into the central bank. I ask how this safe-haven channel shaped the financial backdrop of democratization in interwar Spain. The 1931 proclamation of the Second Republic turned long-repressed demands for redistribution into a credible, if uncertain, redistributive threat to large depositors, triggering a run on bank deposits and capital flight, to which authorities responded by restricting capital mobility. Because opening and using a Banco de España (BdE) retail account required a very high initial deposit and subsequent contributions, access was formally open but effectively restricted to large bank depositors. Using new branch-level balance-sheet data, I document a stronger flight-to-safety to BdE deposits in cities where banks lost more deposits, show that this inflow was persistent, and find that the BdE did not use it to expand credit or replace banks’ lost intermediation due to the run on their deposits. Flight-to-safety into central bank liabilities thus let large depositors preserve the nominal value of their wealth, but without an offsetting expansion of public (central bank) money, the resulting fall in private money went uncompensated — contributing to the credit contraction that marked the democratic Republic’s first months.
中文摘要
过去，中央银行同时也是零售机构，直接接受公众存款。本文研究银行危机期间一次历史性的安全资产转移事件，其中大额存款人从银行提取存款，不仅将其转移至国外或现金，还转移至中央银行。我追问这一安全港渠道如何塑造了两次世界大战之间西班牙民主化的金融背景。1931年第二共和国的宣告，将长期受压抑的再分配诉求转变为对大额存款人而言可信但不确定的再分配威胁，引发了对银行存款的挤兑和资本外逃，当局对此的回应是限制资本流动。由于开设和使用西班牙银行（Banco de España, BdE）零售账户需要极高的初始存款和后续缴款，准入在形式上开放，但实际上仅限于大额银行存款人。利用新的分行层面资产负债表数据，我记录了在银行流失存款更多的城市中，向BdE存款的安全资产转移更为强劲，表明这一流入具有持续性，并发现BdE并未利用其扩大信贷或替代银行因存款挤兑而失去的中介功能。向中央银行负债的安全资产转移因而让大额存款人得以保全其财富的名义价值，但在没有公共（中央银行）货币相应扩张的情况下，由此导致的私人货币下降未得到补偿——这加剧了标志着民主共和国最初数月的信贷收缩。