Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
允许电力公用事业竞选捐款的经济与监管效应
The Economic and Regulatory Effects of Permitting Electric Utility Campaign Contributions
摘要
This paper examines the economic and regulatory effects of legalizing electric utility campaign contributions. Exploiting variation in state campaign finance laws and the 2005 repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, which lifted a federal ban on utility treasury contributions, I find that legalization significantly increased the return on equity authorized by state regulators. Although higher authorized returns encourage investment, distribution plant in service declined, contributing to a deterioration in service reliability and billions in annual outage costs. These findings show that utility campaign contributions can shape regulatory policy in utilities’ favor while imposing substantial costs on consumers.
中文摘要
本文考察了电力公用事业竞选捐款合法化的经济与监管效应。利用州竞选财务法律的差异以及2005年《公用事业控股公司法》的废止——该废止解除了对公用事业企业资金捐款的联邦禁令——我发现，合法化显著提高了州监管机构批准的股本回报率。尽管更高的批准回报率会鼓励投资，但在运配电设施却有所下降，导致服务可靠性恶化，并造成每年数十亿美元的停电成本。这些发现表明，公用事业竞选捐款能够以使公用事业受益的方式塑造监管政策，同时给消费者带来巨大成本。