Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
寻求解除武装和平的艰难探索：竞争博弈与国际关系
The elusive quest for disarmed peace: contest games and international relations
摘要
This paper develops a dynamic game-theoretic framework to analyze security competition between two states that can invest in a technology to eliminate their rival. Extending the canonical one-shot game, our model incorporates a negotiation (settlement) stage and assumes effective diplomacy, which rules out payoff-dominated equilibria. We fully characterize equilibrium behavior across all discount factors and compare outcomes under high and low elimination costs. The dynamic structure reveals why, even with optimal coordination, long-lasting disarmed peace is rare. By combining the dynamics of military escalation with the constraints of effective diplomacy, the model rationalizes historical cycles of peace, arms races, and conflict. Our approach identifies strategic mechanisms that restrict the sustainability of disarmament and clarifies the conditions under which arms races or conflict become inevitable, offering a deeper understanding of the recurrent nature of international conflict under repeated interaction.
中文摘要
本文构建了一个动态博弈理论框架，用于分析两个国家在投资消除对手技术时的安全竞争。在经典单次博弈的基础上，我们的模型引入了谈判（和解）阶段，并假设有效外交排除了收益占优均衡。我们全面刻画了所有折现因子下的均衡行为，并比较了高消除成本与低消除成本下的结果。动态结构揭示了为何即使在最优协调下，持久的非武装和平也极为罕见。通过将军事升级的动态过程与有效外交的约束相结合，该模型合理化了和平、军备竞赛与冲突的历史循环。我们的方法识别出限制裁军可持续性的战略机制，并阐明了军备竞赛或冲突不可避免的条件，从而在重复互动背景下为理解国际冲突的反复性提供了更深刻的洞见。