Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
竞选财务放松管制对美国选举的均衡效应
The Equilibrium Effects of Campaign Finance Deregulation on U.S. Elections
摘要
The U.S. Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission deregulated campaign finance, enabling the rise of a new political action committee (the Super PAC) with broad freedom to raise and spend money. This led to an unprecedented surge in spending in primary and general elections. To evaluate the impact of Super PACs, I estimate a multistage model of political competition using data from U.S. Congressional elections between 2010 and 2020. I find that Super PAC spending by both sides prompts offsetting responses, resulting in limited net equilibrium effects. However, by amplifying the role of donors, Super PACs still have the potential to reshape the electoral landscape.
中文摘要
美国最高法院2010年就"联合公民诉联邦选举委员会案"作出的裁决放松了对竞选资金的监管，催生了一种新型政治行动委员会（超级政治行动委员会），使其在筹款和支出方面拥有广泛自由。这导致初选和大选中的支出出现前所未有的激增。为评估超级政治行动委员会的影响，我利用2010年至2020年美国国会选举数据，估计了一个多阶段政治竞争模型。研究发现，双方超级政治行动委员会的支出会引发对冲性反应，导致均衡效应有限。然而，通过放大捐赠者的作用，超级政治行动委员会仍有可能重塑选举格局。