Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
爱国主义演变
The evolution of patriotism
摘要
This paper presents an evolutionary model of patriotism. The state interacts with a population of citizens who may differ in their levels of patriotism, reflecting how much they care about the state. Citizens’ patriotism is subject to evolutionary pressure in the long run. Under complete information, if the state’s payoff function exhibits strategic complementarity, patriotism can emerge through evolution. In the presence of incomplete information, however, patriotism fails to thrive. Despite this, if citizens can costlessly disclose their levels of patriotism to the state in a truthful but potentially imprecise manner, full information revelation can be achieved under certain monotonicity conditions—one of which can be derived from the supermodularity of the interaction between the state and citizens—thus allowing patriotism to evolve in a manner similar to the complete information case.
中文摘要
本文构建了一个关于爱国主义的演化模型。国家与一群公民互动，这些公民的爱国主义程度可能不同，反映了他们对国家的关心程度。公民的爱国主义在长期中受到演化压力的影响。在完全信息条件下，如果国家的收益函数表现出策略互补性，爱国主义可以通过演化过程产生。然而，在不完全信息条件下，爱国主义无法蓬勃发展。尽管如此，如果公民能够以真实但可能不精确的方式，无成本地向国家披露其爱国主义程度，则在某些单调性条件下——其中一种条件可源于国家与公民之间互动的超模性——可以实现完全信息揭示，从而使爱国主义得以在类似于完全信息的情形下演化。