Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
厌恶说谎与亲社会谎言对欺骗行为的影响
The impact of lying aversion and prosocial lies on cheating
摘要
This paper examines how prosocial motivations shape lying behavior in a strategic setting. Two players each privately choose a color in their mind, then draw a color at random, and report whether the two colors match. Both players receive a high payoff if at least one reports a match, so a single lie secures the payoff for both, making lies strategic substitutes. I develop a theoretical model in which individuals bear a psychological cost of lying but experience a lower cost when their lie increases their partner’s payoff. The model predicts that individuals are less likely to lie when they can rely on their partner to do so, and more likely to lie when their dishonesty benefits their partner. I test these predictions in an online experiment with four treatments that separately vary the opportunity to rely on the partner’s lie and the presence of a benefit to the partner. In this setting, prosocial motives outweigh lying aversion: participants lie more when their dishonesty benefits their partner, and they do not lie less when they can leave the lie to their partner. Lying increases only when a participant’s report is pivotal to the partner’s payoff, indicating that prosocial preferences reduce the net cost of lying when dishonesty is instrumental in generating benefits for others.
中文摘要
本文考察了亲社会动机如何在策略性情境中塑造说谎行为。两名参与者各自在头脑中私下选择一种颜色，然后随机抽取一种颜色，并报告这两种颜色是否匹配。如果至少有一人报告匹配，则两名参与者都获得高额收益，因此一次说谎就能为双方确保收益，这使得说谎成为策略性替代。我构建了一个理论模型，其中个体承担说谎的心理成本，但当其说谎增加同伴收益时，所承受的成本较低。该模型预测，当个体可以依赖同伴说谎时，他们更不可能说谎；而当其不诚实行为使同伴受益时，他们更可能说谎。我在一项在线实验中检验了这些预测，实验包含四种处理，分别改变依赖同伴说谎的机会以及是否存在对同伴的收益。在这一情境中，亲社会动机压倒了说谎厌恶：当参与者的不诚实行为使同伴受益时，他们说谎更多；而当他们可以把说谎留给同伴时，他们说谎并不会减少。只有当参与者的报告对同伴收益具有关键作用时，说谎才会增加，这表明当不诚实行为有助于为他人带来收益时，亲社会偏好会降低说谎的净成本。