Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
基于绩效的贸易补贴与亏损领先的激励优势
The Incentive Virtues of Performance‐Based Trade Allowances and Loss Leading
摘要
A retailer can boost demand for a manufacturer's product through non‐verifiable activities. Performance‐based trade allowances—rebates conditional on the retailer's successful sales efforts—help mitigate this moral hazard problem. In equilibrium, the wholesale contract includes a retail price set below cost, complemented by a rebate for incremental units purchased when efforts successfully increase sales. Loss leading thus emerges as an incentive mechanism, rather than a practice driven by anti‐competitive or exploitative intent. A ban on below‐cost pricing leads to higher retail prices and reduced promotional efforts.
中文摘要
零售商可以通过不可验证的活动提升制造商产品的需求。基于绩效的贸易补贴——即以零售商成功销售努力为条件的返利——有助于缓解这一道德风险问题。在均衡状态下，批发合同包含低于成本的零售价格，并辅以当努力成功提升销售时对增量购买单位给予的返利。因此，亏损领先作为一种激励机制出现，而非由反竞争或剥削意图驱动的行为。对低于成本定价的禁令会导致更高的零售价格和减少的促销努力。