Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
个体—团队不连续性对制度选择的影响：自愿公共物品供给中的实验证据
The individual‐team discontinuity effect on institutional choices: Experimental evidence in voluntary public goods provision
摘要
A laboratory experiment finds that teams acting as a decision‐making unit through communication behave more efficiently than individuals. Decision‐making units vote on formal and informal sanctions in a repeated public goods dilemma. When a formal scheme is selected, teams vote for deterrent sanction rates more frequently than individuals. When an informal scheme is selected, teams inflict costly punishment more frequently toward low contributors. As such, teams sustain cooperation more efficaciously than individuals. The results underscore the effectiveness of utilizing teams as a decision‐making unit in organizations in combating moral hazard, such as free riding.
中文摘要
一项实验室实验发现，通过沟通作为决策单元行事的团队比个体行为更有效率。在重复的公共物品困境中，决策单元对正式和非正式制裁进行投票。当选择正式方案时，团队比个体更频繁地投票支持具有威慑力的制裁率。当选择非正式方案时，团队更频繁地对低贡献者施加代价高昂的惩罚。因此，团队比个体更有效地维持合作。这些结果凸显了在组织中利用团队作为决策单元来应对道德风险（如搭便车）的有效性。