Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
双重股权结构公司股票价格的信息含量
The informativeness of stock price at dual-class firms
摘要
We examine whether disproportionate insider control, or the divergence between insider voting and cash flow rights at dual-class firms, influences the extent to which stock price reflects information about future firm performance. We find that current returns incorporate less information about future earnings and cash flows as disproportionate insider control increases. However, monitoring by influential institutional investors, strong board oversight, and high-quality disclosure significantly attenuate this effect, such that disproportionate insider control does not result in less informative stock prices. Collectively, our findings reveal that, although the dual-class structure is associated with less informative stock prices, on average, monitoring and disclosure can alleviate investor concerns about disproportionate insider control while allowing firms to take advantage of the benefits of a dual-class ownership structure.
中文摘要
我们考察了双重股权结构公司中不成比例的内部人控制，即内部人投票权与现金流权之间的差异，是否影响股价反映未来公司业绩信息的程度。研究发现，随着不成比例的内部人控制增强，当前收益对未来盈利和现金流信息的包含程度降低。然而，有影响力的机构投资者监督、强有力的董事会监管以及高质量的信息披露显著削弱了这一效应，使得不成比例的内部人控制不会导致股价信息含量降低。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，尽管双重股权结构平均而言与股价信息含量较低相关，但监督和披露能够缓解投资者对不成比例内部人控制的担忧，同时使企业能够利用双重股权结构带来的优势。