Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
慷慨设计问题
The Largesse design problem
摘要
Abstract Largesse design is a positive theory of what happens when players in a game, who have a limited willingness to sacrifice for the common good, can coordinate on a welfare-optimal solution. This theory provides an alternative to psychological theories in explaining why players engage in costly punishments and rewards. It also says that players will engage in other low-cost methods of encouraging pro-social behavior, for example, through reputation effects. In this paper, I study the properties and comparative statics of the largesse design problem. Despite a lack of concavity in the maximization problem, solutions are unique and continuous except on a lower-dimensional bifurcation set. In examples, I study these bifurcations, in which a small change in the parameters can lead to a large change in behavior or welfare.
中文摘要
慷慨设计是一种实证理论，用以说明当博弈参与者为共同利益做出牺牲的意愿有限时，他们如何能够协调达成福利最优解。该理论为解释参与者为何进行代价高昂的惩罚与奖励提供了一种替代心理学理论的视角。它还指出，参与者会采用其他低成本方法来鼓励亲社会行为，例如通过声誉效应。本文研究慷慨设计问题的性质与比较静态。尽管最大化问题缺乏凹性，其解仍是唯一的，并且除在一个低维分岔集上之外是连续的。在示例中，我研究了这些分岔，其中参数的微小变化可能导致行为或福利的巨大变化。