Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
创新的组织：不完全合同与外包决策
The Organization of Innovation: Incomplete Contracts and the Outsourcing Decision
摘要
Why do firms outsource research and development (R&D) for some products while conducting R&D in-house for similar ones? An innovating firm risks cannibalizing its existing products. The more profitable these products, the more the firm wants to limit cannibalization. We apply this logic to the organization of R&D by introducing a novel theoretical model in which developing in-house provides the firm more control over the new product’s location in product space. An empirical analysis of our testable predictions using pharmaceutical data concerning patents, patent expiration, and outsourcing at various stages of the R&D process supports our theoretical approach. (JEL D21, D22, L22, L24, L65, O31, O34)
中文摘要
为什么企业会对某些产品外包研发，而对类似产品进行内部研发？创新企业面临蚕食现有产品的风险。现有产品利润越高，企业就越想限制这种蚕食。我们将这一逻辑应用于研发组织方式，提出了一个新颖的理论模型：内部研发能让企业更好地控制新产品在产品空间中的定位。我们利用制药行业关于专利、专利到期以及研发各阶段外包的数据，对可检验的预测进行了实证分析，结果支持了我们的理论方法。（JEL D21, D22, L22, L24, L65, O31, O34）