Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
标准化的悖论：电动汽车充电站兼容性政策的博弈论分析
The paradox of standardization: A game-theoretic analysis of EV charging station compatibility policy
摘要
This research investigates the impact of policy-mandated electric vehicle (EV) charging station compatibility on incentives of EV charging network investment, EV market competition and their welfare implications using a game-theoretical approach. Through a comprehensive comparative static analysis, our study uncovers non-monotonic effects of charging station compatibility regulations on firms’ competitive strategies, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Key findings reveal that stricter compatibility regulations lead efficient EV manufacturers to reduce investments, resulting in a decline in industry-wide deployment of charging stations. This compatibility-driven investment shift subsequently influences EV price competition dynamics: efficient manufacturers lower prices to capture market share, while inefficient counterparts raise prices to offset escalating charging station deployment costs. Paradoxically, our analysis demonstrates that policies imposing stricter compatibility regulations may reduce consumer surplus, despite unintentionally benefiting inefficient manufacturers. Notably, strengthening the investment advantages for efficient manufacturers consistently increases industry-wide charging station deployment while improving both consumer surplus and social welfare. The study concludes with conditional policy insights and managerial implications that characterize how alternative compatibility levels affect market outcomes and social welfare.
中文摘要
本研究运用博弈论方法，考察政策强制要求的电动汽车充电站兼容性对电动汽车充电网络投资激励、电动汽车市场竞争及其福利影响的作用。通过全面的比较静态分析，本研究揭示了充电站兼容性规制对企业竞争策略、消费者剩余和社会福利的非单调影响。关键发现表明，更严格的兼容性规制会促使高效率电动汽车制造商减少投资，导致全行业充电站部署下降。这种由兼容性驱动的投资变化进而影响电动汽车价格竞争动态：高效率制造商降低价格以获取市场份额，而低效率制造商则提高价格以抵消不断上升的充电站部署成本。矛盾的是，我们的分析表明，实施更严格兼容性规制的政策可能会降低消费者剩余，尽管会无意中使低效率制造商受益。值得注意的是，强化高效率制造商的投资优势会持续增加全行业充电站部署，同时改善消费者剩余和社会福利。本研究最后提出了有条件的情境化政策启示和管理启示，刻画了不同兼容性水平如何影响市场结果和社会福利。