Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
内生选址下管理层授权的盈利能力
The profitability of managerial delegation with endogenous locations
摘要
Research on managerial delegation typically suggests that firms in a Cournot duopoly compete more aggressively in the product market post-delegation, causing their profits to decline. This paper investigates the profitability of delegation by incorporating a sales-delegation strategy into a spatial barbell model, where consumers are asymmetrically distributed at the two endpoints of a line segment. We find that the firm located closer to the more populated market may benefit from delegation. Notably, this occurs when the locational equilibrium shifts from agglomeration to separation following delegation. Although the firms compete more intensely under delegation, social welfare decreases when the locational equilibrium changes from separation to agglomeration and the transport rate is sufficiently high.
中文摘要
关于管理授权的研究通常表明，在古诺双寡头市场中，企业授权后会在产品市场上展开更激烈的竞争，导致其利润下降。本文通过将销售授权策略引入空间杠铃模型（其中消费者非对称地分布于线段两端）来研究授权的盈利性。研究发现，位于人口更密集市场附近的企业可能从授权中获益。值得注意的是，当授权导致区位均衡从集聚转向分离时，这一现象才会出现。尽管授权下企业竞争更为激烈，但当区位均衡从分离转向集聚且运输费率足够高时，社会福利反而会下降。