明星CEO的聚光灯效应：股价信息含量的证据

摘要

Drawing on information asymmetry theory and the reputational governance perspective, this study examines whether Superstar CEOs improve capital market pricing efficiency by facilitating the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices. Using Chinese A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2024, we identify Superstar CEOs from authoritative business media rankings and examine their effect on stock price synchronicity. The results show that Superstar CEOs significantly reduce stock price synchronicity, and this finding remains robust across multiple endogeneity tests, alternative measures, model specifications and sample adjustments. Mechanism analyses suggest that publicly certified superstar status increases CEOs’ reputational exposure and accountability, thereby reducing information asymmetry, increasing disclosure specificity and attracting greater media and investor attention. Additional tests indicate that the decline in synchronicity is more consistent with improved pricing of firm-specific information than with noise trading or systematic risk pricing. The effect is stronger under more effective internal governance and when CEOs possess greater organizational authority. Further analysis shows that the decline in synchronicity associated with Superstar CEOs is linked to lower future stock price crash risk. Overall, CEO reputation functions as an informal governance asset that improves the capital market information environment.