Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
平台入侵的战略价值：卖家进入与网络效应
The Strategic Value of Platform Encroachment: Seller Entry and Network Effects
摘要
In a platform market where user participation is endogenous and shaped by direct network effects, we compare the competitive and welfare effects of two alternative business models: pure intermediation and ‘encroachment’ — a hybrid model where the platform competes with third-party sellers by selling its own private-label products. There are two groups of sellers: entrants, who must pay a specialization cost to access the marketplace, and incumbents, who have already paid it. With encroachment, the platform has no incentive to entirely foreclose their downstream rivals if there are positive network effects. Surprisingly, although encroachment restricts entry, it increases consumer surplus, total welfare, and the incumbents’ profit when there is a sufficiently large number of incumbents in the marketplace.
中文摘要
在用户参与内生且受直接网络效应影响的平台市场中，我们比较了两种替代商业模式——纯中介与“入侵”（一种平台通过销售自有品牌产品与第三方卖家竞争的混合模式）——的竞争与福利效应。市场中有两组卖家：进入者，需支付专业化成本才能进入市场；以及在位者，已支付该成本。在入侵模式下，若存在正网络效应，平台没有动机完全排挤其下游竞争对手。令人意外的是，尽管入侵限制了进入，但当市场中在位者数量足够多时，它反而提高了消费者剩余、总福利以及在位者的利润。