Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
多数在多胜者计分规则下的T权力
The T-power of a majority under multi-winner scoring rules
摘要
In multi-winner elections, the goal is to select a pre-given size committee of members from a given set of candidates. We define the concept of T-power of a majority-group of voters (Total majority-power or Total tyranny-power) as the ability of the group to guarantee, under a given voting rule, that all the committee members belong to its favorite candidates, regardless of the preferences of the other voters. In this case, we say also that such a voting rule is exposed to T-power. This situation can be considered extreme and worrying in democracy. In this paper, we examine the T-power under classes of multi-winner scoring rules. We focus on some common rules, and it turns out that BLOC rule ( k - k -Approval) is totally exposed to T-power, that is, any majority-group of any size has T-power under this rule. On the other hand, CCR, k -Plurality and k -Inverse-Plurality rules are almost notexposed to it, that is, no majority of any size has T-power. These last rules may provide some protection for minority groups in the sense of preventing T-power.
中文摘要
在多赢家选举中，目标是从给定候选人集合中选出预先设定规模的委员会成员。我们定义多数选民群体的T-权力（总多数权力或总暴政权力）为：在给定投票规则下，该群体能够确保所有委员会成员均来自其偏好的候选人，而无论其他选民的偏好如何。在此情况下，我们也称该投票规则暴露于T-权力之下。这种情形在民主制度中可被视为极端且令人担忧。本文研究了多赢家计分规则类别下的T-权力。我们聚焦于若干常见规则，发现BLOC规则（k-k-批准制）完全暴露于T-权力，即任何规模的多数群体在此规则下均拥有T-权力。另一方面，CCR、k-复数制与k-逆复数制规则几乎不暴露于T-权力，即任何规模的多数群体均不拥有T-权力。这些规则在防止T-权力意义上可能为少数群体提供一定保护。