Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文

合规的重负:反洗钱执法、银行业结构与贷款

The Weight of Compliance: Anti-Money Laundering Enforcement, Banking Sector Composition, and Lending

Şenay Ağca, Pablo Slutzky, Stefan Zeume

来源
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · 期刊论文
本站首次发现
2026-10-27 18:02
日期信息
Crossref 元数据日期 2026-10-27 · 来源:Crossref
主题
金融劳动公共与政治经济学理论与博弈

摘要

We examine how strengthened anti-money laundering (AML) enforcement affects the U.S. banking sector. Heightened enforcement disproportionately raises compliance costs for small banks, especially in counties more exposed to money laundering. In these areas, small banks contract while large banks expand, increasing standardized, government-supported, and secured lending. While aggregate county-level credit does not decline differentially, local outcomes improve. Small establishments grow, non-tradable employment and wages rise, and real estate prices increase. The evidence is consistent with a reallocation mechanism in which AML enforcement shifts activity toward large banks, potentially improving intermediation quality through changes in the composition of local financial intermediation.