私人乘客重量下的可交易载荷权：航空公司容量分配的市场设计方法

摘要

Aircraft payload capacity is a scarce operational resource jointly consumed by passenger body weight, non-tradable cabin and baseline baggage loads, and verified discretionary checked baggage; however, airline baggage policies typically allocate this capacity through uniform allowances and excess baggage fees. This study examines how such capacity can be allocated when passenger body weight is sensitive and privately known at the contracting stage, whereas checked baggage weight is verifiable at check-in. This study formulates a tradable payload-rights mechanism as a competitive-clearing market-design benchmark in which an airline defines the residual capacity available for verified discretionary checked baggage and passengers trade rights to carry baggage above a baseline allowance. A planner benchmark identifies the shadow price of the payload capacity. The main result establishes that under competitive trading, verifiable baggage, and market clearing, the equilibrium permit price decentralizes the planner’s benchmark allocation on the verified discretionary checked-baggage margin. The analysis separates allocative efficiency from incidence: the permit price governs the efficient allocation of scarce payload capacity, whereas the initial endowment of rights determines transfers among passengers and the division of scarcity rents between passengers and the airline. The analysis also considers implementation without direct pay-as-you-weigh pricing, emphasizing verification and settlement procedures that do not require direct body-weight reporting, airline revenue compatibility, and operational capacity shocks. The framework provides a market-design benchmark for implementing scarcity pricing on a verifiable checked-baggage margin when direct passenger-weight pricing is institutionally and socially constrained.