Econ Papers Daily / 工作论文
培训你的替代者：工人激励与自动化速度
Training Your Replacement: Worker Incentives and the Pace of Automation
摘要
Firms ask workers to train AI systems that will replace them. We model this with a worker who can shirk, cooperate with training, or obstruct training while maintaining productivity. Because training ends the job but only cooperation completes training, dismissal becomes a weaker penalty for shirking. The firm must raise the worker’s rent, and the worker gains from their replacement. AI can create jobs paying more than they produce and eliminate jobs it never automates. Firms paying only wages may slow training. A credible completion bonus equal to the worker’s rent without AI removes both the gain and the slowdown.
中文摘要
企业要求工人训练将取代他们的AI系统。我们用一个工人来建模：该工人可以偷懒、配合训练，或在保持生产率的同时阻碍训练。由于训练会终止工作，但只有配合才能完成训练，解雇成为对偷懒更弱的惩罚。企业必须提高工人的租金，而工人从其被替代中获益。AI可以创造薪酬高于其产出的工作岗位，也可以消除它从未自动化的岗位。仅支付工资的企业可能会放缓训练。等于无AI时工人租金的可信完成奖金消除了收益和放缓。