Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
非策略环境中的真实信息诱导
Truth Elicitation in a Nonstrategic Environment
摘要
A principal decides which party deserves a prize. Only the parties observe the state that determines who is deserving. The principal gives each party a text describing the conditions under which that party deserves the prize, and asks each to report the state. The parties are nonstrategic. Each activates a known cheating procedure whose outcome depends on the state and on the text. Implementation is achieved if, whenever the parties disagree, the liar is identified by the “one-way cheating principle”: The truthful party is the unique party who could not have produced his story had the rival’s story been true.
中文摘要
委托人决定哪一方应获得奖项。只有各方能观察到决定谁应得该奖项的状态。委托人向每一方提供一份描述该方应得奖项条件的文本，并要求各方报告状态。各方不采取策略性行为。每一方激活一个已知的作弊程序，其结果取决于状态和文本。当各方意见不一致时，通过“单向作弊原则”识别说谎者，从而实现实施：诚实方是唯一在对手所述为真时无法编造自己故事的一方。