Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
无期望效用偏好下的两人零和博弈：一个提议
Two-person zero-sum games without expected utility preferences: a proposal
摘要
A solution concept for two-person zero-sum games is proposed with only the axiom of Independence assumed of players’ preferences. Each player is shown to admit a set of admissible strategies assuring minimum guarantees. Rationality requires agents to reject non-admissible strategies in further considerations. Knowledge assumptions imply iterated elimination of non-admissible strategies resulting in surviving sets whose Cartesian product form consideration equilibria which is nonempty and includes any Nash equilibrium, if one exists. It coincides with the set of Nash equilibria or minimax strategy tuples if preferences additionally satisfy Continuity. Further, consideration equilibria of a game are contained in the set of minimax strategy tuples of the continuous approximation of the given game.
中文摘要
针对两人零和博弈，提出了一种仅假设玩家偏好满足独立性公理时的解概念。每位玩家被证明拥有一组确保最低收益保证的可接受策略。理性要求参与者在进一步考虑中排除非可接受策略。知识假设意味着对非可接受策略进行迭代剔除，最终存活的策略集合的笛卡尔积构成考虑均衡，该均衡非空，并且若存在纳什均衡，则包含所有纳什均衡。若偏好额外满足连续性，则该均衡与纳什均衡集或极小极大策略组合集一致。此外，博弈的考虑均衡包含于给定博弈的连续逼近的极小极大策略组合集中。