Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
非关联组成部分审计师与审计费用模型：低价揽客案例
Unaffiliated Component Auditors and Audit Fee Models: The Case of Lowballing
摘要
Disclosure rules in many countries require public companies to report fees paid to the principal audit firm and its affiliates, but not to unaffiliated component auditors (UCAs). Reported fees thus depend on component auditor affiliation. We show that UCA involvement is significant in many countries. Using Italian private companies’ public filings, we find that UCA involvement is a statistically and economically significant source of bias in audit fee models. This bias is particularly relevant around principal auditor changes, when some subsidiaries temporarily retain UCAs before switching to auditors affiliated with the new principal auditor. The exclusion of fees paid to temporary UCAs explains the initial-year audit fee discount (lowballing) previously documented, which disappears once these omitted fees are accounted for. Our results suggest that lowballing reflects measurement bias rather than systematic strategic pricing. Because UCAs are common internationally and disclosure rules similarly exclude these fees, this bias extends beyond Italy.
中文摘要
许多国家的披露规则要求上市公司报告支付给主审计事务所及其关联机构的费用，但不要求报告支付给非关联组成部分审计师（UCAs）的费用。因此，所报告的费用取决于组成部分审计师的关联关系。我们表明，UCA的参与在许多国家具有显著意义。利用意大利私营公司的公开申报文件，我们发现UCA的参与是审计费用模型中统计上和经济上显著的偏差来源。这种偏差在主审计师变更前后尤为相关，此时一些子公司会暂时聘请UCAs，之后再转聘与新任主审计师关联的审计师。剔除支付给临时UCAs的费用，可以解释此前文献记录的首次审计费用折价（低价揽客）现象，而一旦将这些被遗漏的费用纳入考量，该现象便消失。我们的结果表明，低价揽客反映的是计量偏差，而非系统性的战略定价。由于UCAs在国际上较为普遍，且披露规则同样排除这些费用，这一偏差的影响范围超出意大利。