Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
一价全支付拍卖中基于价值的恶意行为
Value-dependent spite in first-price all-pay auctions
摘要
I introduce value-dependent spite into first-price all-pay auctions and demonstrate that it leads to overbidding. Unlike in first- and second-price winner-pay auctions, value-dependent spite does not change the basic curvature of equilibrium bids: they remain convex. Nonetheless, value-dependent spite predicts different overbidding patterns from those predicted by value-independent spite. My main result highlights that, for low values, equilibrium bids when spite is value-dependent are closer to the non-spiteful benchmark than when spite is value-independent. Using approximations, I show that this result is strengthened when the relationship between a bidder’s value and her degree of spite is convex and weakened when it is concave.
中文摘要
本文将价值依赖型恶意引入第一价格全支付拍卖，并证明其会导致过度出价。与第一价格和第二价格赢家支付拍卖不同，价值依赖型恶意不会改变均衡出价的基本曲率：均衡出价仍保持凸性。尽管如此，价值依赖型恶意所预测的过度出价模式与价值独立型恶意所预测的不同。本文的主要结果表明，对于低价值情形，当恶意是价值依赖型时，均衡出价比恶意是价值独立型时更接近无恶意基准。通过近似分析，本文表明当竞标者价值与其恶意程度之间的关系为凸时，这一结果会增强；当该关系为凹时，这一结果会减弱。