Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
选民信息与分配政治
Voter Information and Distributive Politics
摘要
Does more information benefit voters? I examine this question in a novel setting of distributive politics and electoral accountability. Homogeneously informed electorates can benefit from less information through improvements in the control or screening of politicians. For heterogeneously informed electorates, I show that the distribution of resources and voter welfare is affected by the nature of informational heterogeneity and by voters’ ability to communicate with each other, making less-informed voters better off than their more-informed counterparts in some cases. (JEL D72, D82, D83, H50)
中文摘要
更多信息是否有利于选民？我在分配政治与选举问责这一新颖情境中探讨了该问题。信息同质的选民群体可能因信息减少而受益，这源于对政治家控制或筛选机制的改善。对于信息异质的选民群体，研究表明资源分配与选民福利受信息异质性特征及选民间沟通能力的影响，在某些情况下信息较少的选民反而比信息更多的选民处境更优。（JEL D72, D82, D83, H50）