Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
工资盗窃、市场势力与外包：H-1B工人的案例
Wage Theft, Market Power, and Outsourcing: The Case of H‐1B Workers
摘要
Wage violations against H‐1B visa holders (i.e., cutting their wages below a legally required prevailing wage) are analysed using detailed firm‐level data. The incidence of violations is 25%–35% lower in a monopsony versus a competitive labour market, and 60% of firms with at least one violation are subcontractors. A new theoretical model provides an interpretation for these findings, predicting that violations are more likely when firms have less labour market power and generally wherever firm profit margins are more vulnerable to a negative shock (e.g., in subcontractors that have been outsourced work and firms seeking to hire lower‐skilled workers).
中文摘要
本文利用详细的企業層面數據，分析了針對H-1B簽證持有者的工資違法行為（即將其工資削減至低於法定現行工資標準）。在買方壟斷勞動力市場中，違法行為的發生率比競爭性勞動力市場低25%–35%，而在至少存在一起違法行為的企業中，60%為分包商。一個新的理論模型為這些發現提供了詮釋，預測當企業的勞動力市場勢力較弱時，違法行為更可能發生；並且一般而言，凡是企業利潤率更易受到負面衝擊影響的情形（例如，承接外包工作的分包商以及試圖僱用較低技能工人的企業），違法行為也更為普遍。