Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
当精英 meritocracy 失效：大学扩招与代际固化的兴起
When Meritocracy Fails: College Expansion and the Rise of Intergenerational Persistence
摘要
This paper quantifies the effects of college expansion under purely merit-based, competitive admissions, endogenizing pre-labor-market conditions. We develop a heterogeneous-agent life-cycle model where parents invest in their children’s pre-college human capital at multiple stages to compete for limited college slots. Applying the framework to China—where admissions rely solely on score ranks and enrollment has grown tenfold over the past 25 years—we find that score-based admissions increase the importance of human capital at the college admission stage relative to initial endowments. Family resources therefore shape admission indirectly through parental investment in pre-college human capital. Expanding college access under this system reduces intergenerational mobility because higher-income families respond by disproportionately increasing pre-college investments, strengthening the link between child achievement and parental income. Counterfactuals show that mobility would improve with college expansion if endogenous parental investment responses were shut down.
中文摘要
本文量化了在纯粹择优、竞争性录取条件下大学扩招的效果，并将劳动力市场前的条件内生化。我们构建了一个异质性主体生命周期模型，其中父母在多个阶段对子女的大学前人力资本进行投资，以竞争有限的大学名额。将该框架应用于中国——中国的大学录取完全依赖分数排名，且过去25年间招生规模增长了十倍——我们发现，基于分数的录取提高了大学录取阶段人力资本相对于初始禀赋的重要性。因此，家庭资源通过父母对大学前人力资本的投资间接塑造录取结果。在这一制度下扩大大学入学机会会降低代际流动性，因为高收入家庭会通过不成比例地增加大学前投资来回应，从而强化子女成就与父母收入之间的联系。反事实分析表明，如果关闭内生性的父母投资反应，大学扩招将改善流动性。