When should firms promote consumer learning? An experimental study

摘要

We experimentally examine firms’ incentives to provide information that enables consumers to learn about product valuations. In our design, firms make take-it-or-leave-it offers to consumers who are uncertain about their own valuations. Firms can choose to facilitate learning without observing what consumers learn. Consistent with theory, firms are more likely to provide information when ex-ante gains from trade are low, particularly when marginal costs are high. Consumers, however, depart from the benchmark model: acceptance rates are lower when the absence of learning is chosen by the firm than when exogenously imposed, even though the firm’s choice conveys no information about valuation. Firms that permit learning charge higher prices, but, relative to theory, low-cost firms oversupply information while high-cost firms undersupply it. These patterns are consistent with consumer responses to intentional nondisclosure influencing firms’ pricing and information provision.