Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
谁选择退出个人担保？小企业贷款中的借款人选择与绩效
Who opts out of personal guarantees? Borrower selection and performance in small business lending
摘要
In many countries, small businesses rely on loans backed by personal guarantees from company managers, making managers personally liable for loan repayment if the business fails. Such guarantees may discourage managerial risk-taking by increasing the personal costs of failure. Exploiting a Japanese policy reform aimed at reducing the use of personal guarantees by encouraging monitoring-based loans, this paper examines which firms opt out of personal guarantees and choose monitoring-based loans, and how these loan arrangements are associated with firm risk-taking and performance. We find that: (1) monitoring-based loans carry higher interest rates; (2) firms with stronger credit ratings and lower managerial ownership are more likely to choose monitoring-based loans; and (3) after accounting for positive borrower selection, firms using monitoring-based loans exhibit greater risk-taking, reflected in a higher likelihood of default but stronger growth conditional on survival. Without controlling for selection through managerial ownership and credit ratings, firms borrowing through monitoring-based loans exhibit both lower default probabilities and even higher growth, indicating substantial positive self-selection into opting out of personal guarantees. Overall, the results suggest that allowing borrowers to choose between loans with and without personal guarantees facilitates positive selection into monitoring-based lending and may promote performance-enhancing risk-taking among SMEs.
中文摘要
在许多国家，小企业依赖由公司经理个人担保支持的贷款，若企业失败，经理需对贷款偿还承担个人责任。此类担保可能因增加失败的个人成本而抑制经理的风险承担行为。本文利用日本旨在通过鼓励基于监控的贷款以减少个人担保使用的政策改革，考察哪些企业选择退出个人担保并选用监控型贷款，以及这些贷款安排如何与企业风险承担和绩效相关联。研究发现：（1）监控型贷款利率较高；（2）信用评级较强且管理层持股比例较低的企业更倾向于选择监控型贷款；（3）在考虑借款人正向选择效应后，使用监控型贷款的企业展现出更大的风险承担，表现为违约可能性更高，但在存活条件下增长更为强劲。若未通过管理层持股和信用评级控制选择效应，通过监控型贷款借款的企业则表现出较低的违约概率及更高的增长，表明在退出个人担保方面存在显著的正向自我选择。总体而言，研究结果表明，允许借款人在有无个人担保的贷款之间进行选择，有助于促进监控型贷款中的正向选择，并可能推动中小企业中提升绩效的风险承担行为。