Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
谁为工会买单？
Who Pays for Unions?
摘要
If unions raise worker wages, who pays? We provide a comprehensive assessment of firm responses to increased unionization, using changes in the tax deductibility of union dues in Norway as a quasi-exogenous source of variation in firm-level union density. In the average private sector firm, higher union density raises labor costs and leads firms to contract employment and production, lowering profits without increasing the labor share. The incidence is shared: consumers bear part of the cost through higher prices, shareholders through lower profits, and the remainder is offset by productivity improvements. The total wage bill falls, with losses concentrated among less-attached “outsider” workers. Firm responses vary systematically by the degree of market competition. In manufacturing, where firms operate in less competitive product and labor markets, the response is reversed: the average firm expands employment and production, reduces labor markdowns, and does not experience profit declines. Instead, higher labor costs are largely passed on to consumers through higher prices, with the remainder offset by productivity gains. Workers benefit as both wages and employment rise. These patterns suggest that unions can offset employer monopsony power and that firm responses–and therefore who ultimately bears the cost-depend importantly on market structure. Overall, unionization in this setting primarily redistributes from consumers rather than shareholders and has effects that differ sharply across firms, including a reallocation toward larger and more productive firms. We rationalize these patterns using a partial-equilibrium model of union bargaining with product- and labor-market power.
中文摘要
摘要 如果工会提高工人工资，谁来买单？我们利用挪威工会会费税收抵扣政策的变化作为企业层面工会密度的准外生变动来源，对企业在工会化程度提高时的应对措施进行了全面评估。在私营企业平均层面，工会密度上升会提高劳动力成本，导致企业收缩就业与生产规模，在降低利润的同时并未提升劳动收入份额。成本负担由多方共同承担：消费者通过更高价格承担部分成本，股东通过更低利润承担部分成本，其余部分则被生产率提升所抵消。总工资支出下降，损失集中于依附性较弱的“局外人”工人。企业应对措施随市场竞争程度呈现系统性差异。在制造业中，由于企业面临竞争程度较低的产品与劳动力市场，其应对模式截然相反：平均而言企业会扩大就业与生产规模，降低劳动力市场议价能力，且未出现利润下降。相反，更高的劳动力成本主要通过提价转嫁给消费者，其余部分被生产率提升所抵消。工人因工资与就业同步增长而受益。这些模式表明，工会能够抵消雇主的买方垄断势力，而企业应对措施——以及最终的成本承担者——在很大程度上取决于市场结构。总体而言，该情境下的工会化主要实现从消费者向工人的再分配而非从股东向工人的再分配，且对不同企业产生显著差异化的影响，包括资源向规模更大、生产率更高的企业重新配置。我们通过一个包含产品市场与劳动力市场势力的工会谈判局部均衡模型对这些模式进行了理论解释。