Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
为何首席执行官们（不）遵守法律
Why chief executives (dis)obey the law
摘要
Abstract When and why will chief executives obey the law, and when and why will they violate it? This article constructs a general framework for analyzing legal (non)compliance by a rational chief executive. It evaluates benefits and costs that might result from executive lawbreaking by reference to three types of objectives that chief executives may have: policy and governance objectives, electoral and political objectives, and personal objectives. Assessing the benefits and costs of lawbreaking requires examining not only the chief executive but also how other actors respond to lawbreaking, including legislatures, courts, civil servants, and market actors. Additional factors, such as the chief executive’s discount rate and risk tolerance, also bear on benefits and costs. Understanding the determinants of executive obedience or disobedience generates both hypotheses for further research and a potential reform agenda for those worried about executive lawbreaking.
中文摘要
摘要 行政首长何时以及为何会遵守法律，又在何时以及为何会违反法律？本文构建了一个用于分析理性行政首长法律（不）遵从行为的一般性框架。文章依据行政首长可能具有的三类目标——政策与治理目标、选举与政治目标以及个人目标——来评估行政首长违法行为可能带来的收益与成本。评估违法行为的收益与成本，不仅需要考察行政首长本人，还需考察其他行为主体如何回应违法行为，包括立法机关、法院、公务员和市场行为主体。其他因素，如行政首长的贴现率和风险容忍度，也会影响收益与成本。理解行政首长服从或不服从的决定因素，既能为后续研究提供假设，也能为那些担忧行政首长违法行为的人提供潜在的改革议程。