Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
人们为何抗议？情绪、公共政策与政治动荡的理论
Why Do People Protest? A Theory of Emotions, Public Policy, and Political Unrest
摘要
We build a model of policymaking under the threat of unrest. A policymaker chooses how much effort to spend on a public good; effort is unobservable and the outcome conditional on effort is uncertain. A group of citizens protest if the outcome falls short of a reference point; the reference point is determined endogenously by expectations about the outcome and by the intensity of emotions. We show that the effects of stronger emotional reactions on policymaker’s effort and the probability of protest are nonmonotonic and depend on the group’s ability to inflict damage. Equilibrium may require the policymaker to randomize between providing some effort or no effort at all, in order to temper citizens’ expectations, in which case strong emotional reactions are counterproductive. Optimal emotional reactions are fine-tuned to minimize the probability of protest.
中文摘要
我们构建了一个在骚乱威胁下的政策制定模型。政策制定者需决定投入多少精力用于公共品供给；其努力程度不可观测，且努力所对应的结果具有不确定性。当公共品供给结果低于某个参照点时，公民群体便会发起抗议；该参照点由对结果的预期及情绪强度内生决定。研究表明，情绪反应的增强对政策制定者努力程度及抗议概率的影响呈非单调性，且取决于群体造成损害的能力。均衡状态下，政策制定者可能需要在"付出一定努力"与"完全不努力"之间进行随机化选择，以调节公民预期——此时强烈的情绪反应反而适得其反。最优情绪反应需精准调校，以最小化抗议发生的概率。