Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
为何广播权排他性普遍存在且简单监管为何失效？
Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?
摘要
Pay-TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit. Such an exclusive allocation of rights emerges as a robust equilibrium outcome but may fail to maximize welfare. We analyze whether a ban on resale and a ban on package bidding may improve welfare. These corrective policies have no impact on the final allocation but lead to profit redistribution along the value chain.
中文摘要
付费电视企业在下游争夺观众，同时在上游竞争获取转播权。由于下游竞争所继承的利润满足凸性性质，将转播权分配给主导企业可实现行业利润最大化。这种排他性的转播权分配作为稳健的均衡结果出现，但可能无法实现福利最大化。我们分析禁止转售和禁止组合投标是否能改善福利。这些矫正性政策对最终分配没有影响，但会导致价值链上的利润再分配。