NBER Working Paper w35935所在周报

Implications of Policy Interventions on Eliminating Gender Gaps

消除性别差距的政策干预的影响

Carla Varona Cervantes, Russell Cooper

教育与劳动 未指明区域

Abstract

This paper studies policy interventions intended to eliminate gender differences in labor market outcomes, principally wages. Because gender is an individual attribute rather than a manipulable treatment, the ideal experiment of randomly assigning gender to evaluate its effects is infeasible. Policies that remove gender labels from the employment process are the closest feasible counterpart. We quantify both the intended and unintended consequences of the policies through simulated interventions of an estimated equilibrium model of statistical discrimination with dynamic choices of education and labor market participation. In the short run the policy that requires gender free applications in the market for skilled labor eliminates wage gaps but once education choices respond the effects are attenuated. A more comprehensive policy that enforces gender free compensation reverses the wage gap in skilled markets and eliminates it in unskilled labor markets, even once education adjusts. These interventions impact college rates, the college premium gap and participation rates as well. The final section studies these interventions using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to analyze the simulated data. With education fixed, the DID method recovers the policy effects but this is not the case once education adjusts, reflecting the effects of the intervention on both treated and control groups through equilibrium adjustments in beliefs.

中文摘要

本文研究了旨在消除劳动力市场结果(主要是工资)中性别差异的政策干预。由于性别是个体属性而非可操纵的处理,随机分配性别以评估其影响的理想实验不可行。从就业过程中移除性别标签的政策是最接近的可行对应方案。我们通过一个估计的统计歧视均衡模型(包含教育和劳动力市场参与的动态选择)进行模拟干预,量化了这些政策的预期和非预期后果。短期内,要求技能劳动力市场申请中不出现性别的政策消除了工资差距,但一旦教育选择作出反应,效果就会被削弱。一项更全面的政策,即强制实行无性别薪酬,即使在教育调整之后,也能逆转技能市场中的工资差距,并在非技能劳动力市场中消除该差距。这些干预措施还影响大学入学率、大学溢价差距和参与率。最后一部分使用双重差分(DID)方法分析模拟数据来研究这些干预措施。在教育固定的情况下,DID方法能够恢复政策效应,但一旦教育进行调整,情况就不再如此,这反映了干预通过信念的均衡调整对处理组和对照组都产生了影响。

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