The Great Game: A Model of Geoeconomic Competition
大博弈：地缘经济竞争模型
Abstract
We build a model of two hegemons that have valuable trading relationships with each other and at the same time compete in exerting geoeconomic power over countries in the rest of the world. When the hegemons trade with each other, their optimal policy is shaped both by classic economic considerations - the profitability of that specific trade - and by geoeconomic competition - how the trade affects the power of each hegemon vis-a-vis the rest of the world. We show that containment, a policy mix in which a hegemon limits sales of its inputs to the rival hegemon and uses its power to demand that the rest of the world shift away from sourcing from the rival, arises when the two hegemons offer relatively substitutable exports, are less interdependent with each other, and have more direct geopolitical rivalry. Countries in the rest of the world benefit, all else equal, from hegemons containing each other since they partially squander their power with offsetting demands. However, containment policy can also worsen the efficiency of global production, leaving the rest of the world worse off.
中文摘要
我们构建了一个两个霸权的模型，它们彼此拥有有价值的贸易关系，同时在世界其他地区争夺施加地缘经济权力。当两个霸权相互贸易时，它们的最优政策既受经典经济考量——该特定贸易的盈利能力——的影响，也受地缘经济竞争——该贸易如何影响每个霸权相对于世界其他地区的权力——的影响。我们表明，当两个霸权提供的出口品相对可替代、彼此相互依赖程度较低、且具有更直接的地缘政治竞争时，就会出现遏制——一种政策组合，即一个霸权限制向对手霸权销售其投入品，并利用其权力要求世界其他地区减少从对手采购。在其他条件相同的情况下，世界其他地区的国家会从霸权相互遏制中受益，因为它们通过相互抵消的要求部分浪费了自身权力。然而，遏制政策也可能恶化全球生产效率，使世界其他地区处境更糟。