选择知之更少:需求冲击下纵向市场中的策略性无知作为承诺机制
Choosing to Know Less: Strategic Ignorance as a Commitment Device in Vertical Markets with Demand Shocks
Research Discovery
按每日归档日期组织记录;条目中的本站首次发现时间与官方/在线日期分别展示。
归档日期:2026-10-18;官方/在线日期范围:2026-10-18。条目中的“本站首次发现”按实际首次发现时间展示;支持按期刊、主题、日期类型、可信度和“与中国相关”筛选。
Choosing to Know Less: Strategic Ignorance as a Commitment Device in Vertical Markets with Demand Shocks
Market and welfare effects of marketing cooperatives in spatial procurement markets
Managerial overconfidence and environmental sustainability disclosure: a signalling game with three disclosure choices
Monetary and macroprudential policy with imperfectly competitive banks
Tax design and household risk-taking over the life cycle
Clean steel, higher prices: Ultra-low emission upgrades and local housing markets in China
Selecting an intra-profile dictator
Collective ambiguity attitude as response to individuals’ ones and belief disagreements
Corrigendum to “Removing the fine print: Disclosure, standardized products, and consumer outcomes” [Journal of Financial Economics, volume 185 (November 2026) Article 104353]
Letting AI agents write econometric code